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Whose is the company? Is it the shareholders’, or is it the controllers’? It is not a 
question easily to answer. As everyone knows, voting rights comes from cash flow 
rights, such as the substantial owners firmly control the decision of the listed 
companies through controlling chain. Moreover controlling right that is not based on 
cash flow right is inconstant. For example, the internal controller caused by the 
missing of owners is always instant. We always preconceive that independent 
directors of a company would be more trustable, and the financial reports audited by 
Big4 will be credible than audited by other CPA firms’. However, the relationship 
between the big investors and outside supervisors--independent auditors and 
independent directors, can not be simply complemented or substituted. Furthermore, it 
may be not linear as people usually think about it. 
Evidences indicate that it is hard to choose one kind of corporate governance 
institution that is much better than the others, and there are not constant controllers in 
the chain of corporate governance. So if the capital market is effect, the power of 
different forces and the reasonability of the institution will be reflected by the stock 
prices. 
This study based on the summary of relative literatures and the analysis of data, 
deduces that the main problem of ownership structure in listed companies is large 
investor controlling, always referred as the conflict between the investors. Meanwhile, 
we found that the big investors own large voting rights with little investment by 
pyramid structures or cross-holdings. It means that the large shareholder have the 
motive to tunneling by control the administrant. 
If the capital market is effect, based on the two main factors--the stability of 
earnings and the noise of earnings signal--influence the Earning Response 
Coefficient(ERC), accompanying with the stock price stability, we can deduce that 
different ownership structure will contribute different apriority reflections for earnings 
in short time, the motive of substantial owners will effect the stability of earnings, and 













This study examines the relations among earnings informativeness, measured by 
the earnings--return relation, the ownership structure and the outside supervisors of 
listed companies in China. I found concentrated ownership with 45% voting right will 
get a lowest ERC, and that the higher the divergence rate between cash flow right and 
voting right, the lower the ERC. Otherwise, the top-10 CPA firms do not result in 
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